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PREFACE 
The International Energy Workshop (IEW) is an expanding network of analysts 
concerned with international energy issues. Jointly created in 1981 by IIASA and Stanford 
University, the IEW aims to compare published energy projections and to understand the 
reasons for their divergence. The Workshop process includes iterative polling of projections 
of crude oil prices, economic growth, primary energy consumption and production, and 
energy trade. Successive meetings assess the implications of the comparative projections 
in the presence of most of the poll respondents. 
This report by Professor Manne of Stanford University and Dr. Schrattenholzer of 
IIASA describes the results of the 1983 IEW poll , which served as background to the 
second meeting of the IEW held at IIASA in June 1983. 
HANS-HOLGER ROGNER 
Leader 
Energy Development, Economy, 
and Investments 

Research Repons 
International Energy Workshop: 
A Summary of the 1983 Poll Responses 
Alan S. Manne* and Leo Schrattenholzer** 
INTRODUCTION 
Energy forecasting is a hazardous occupation. Virtually any pro-
jection is doomed to be incorrect. Opinions can swing from one extreme to 
another during a six-month period. Our paper is not intended to provide 
still another projection, but rather to try to explain why different indi-
viduals and organizations arrive at divergent views on the long-term 
energy outlook-and therefore differ on policy decisions. 
This paper is an interim report on the current activities of an informally 
organized group known as the IEW (International Energy Workshop). 
The general aim is to compare the most up-to-date, long-term energy 
projections available throughout the world, and to obtain a better under-
standing of the reasons for their differences. Participation is open to any 
individual who is prepared to contribute to the aims of the IEW. Usually, 
such a contribution consists of summarizing one or more energy scenarios 
by filling in the poll form shown in Appendix Table A-1. The first workshop 
meeting was held at Stanford University in December 1981, and the 
second at IIASA (the International Institute for Applied Systems Analy-
sis, Laxenburg, Austria) in June 1983. 
The poll covers only items that are comparable in existing international 
energy statistics: crude-oil prices, GNP growth, primary energy consump-
tion and production, and electricity generation. Typically, the respondents 
provide a reference case ("surprise-free") scenario. In a few instances, 
there are disruption and/or alternative growth cases. No probability esti-
mates are assigned to individual projections. 
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Table 1. Number of Responses-IEW Regions 
IEW Regions Number of Responses 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
USSR and Eastern Europe 
China and other Asian Planned Economies 
Centrally Planned Economies 
OECD 
OPEC 
NODC (Non-OPEC Developing Countries) 
Market Economies, Subtotal 
World, Total 
Individual countries/regions, not elsewhere classified 
Total 
11 
10 
10 
28 
23 
20 
22 
17 
187 
328 
The poll responses are grouped according to a standardized list of eight 
world regions and a large miscellaneous category (individual countries/ 
regions). Table 1 shows the identification of these regions and the number 
of responses that were received for each. By comparison with the 1981 poll, 
there has been a significant improvement in IEW coverage of the centrally 
planned economies and the developing countries. In this brief summary 
report, we cannot do justice to each of the 328 poll responses that have 
been received. We can only report our preliminary impressions. 
The poll does not require a participant to provide all items shown in 
Table A-1. Thus, far more responses were received for 1980-2000 than for 
the year 2010. This suggests that most of these analyses are concerned 
with short-and intermediate-run decisions (e.g., specific investment 
projects), rather than with long-term questions (e.g., resource depletion, 
global carbon dioxide emissions, and technology development). Each type 
of decision requires a somewhat different time horizon and level of detail. 
Table 2 summarizes the total number of responses received for each 
category. Most participants provided projections of GNP, total primary 
energy and oil consumption, but fewer included details on the other 
primary energy sources: natural gas, coal, hydroelectric, geothermal, and 
nuclear. A still smaller number of the respondents provided estimates for 
"solar and other renewables." In some instances, estimates for this 
category were combined with hydroelectric, geothermal, and other 
sources of energy. I tern 17 (electricity generation) was added to the poll at 
a late date. This may explain why there has been a fairly low response rate 
on this item. An alternative explanation may be that electricity is 
"secondary" rather than primary energy, and is therefore not analyzed 
explicitly in all international energy projections. 
Among the 78 respondents, there are governmental and international 
agencies, oil companies, research institutes, universities, and individuals. 
International Energy Workshop 1983 Poll Responses I 47 
Table2. Total Number of Responsesa 
1980 1990 2000 2010 
Number of entries for each item : 
International price of crude 220 197 197 72 
Real GNP (or GDP) 251 219 223 73 
Total PE consumption 265 233 244 68 
Total PE production 189 184 198 68 
Oil consumption 274 250 244 72 
Oil production 241 243 240 72 
Oil exports-imports 230 247 234 69 
Natural gas consumption 233 202 210 66 
Natural gas production 192 187 200 66 
Natural gas exports-imports 167 180 181 64 
Coal consumption 233 203 212 68 
Coal production 186 181 196 68 
Coal exports-imports 164 177 179 65 
Hydroelectric and geothermal 224 199 209 67 
Nuclear energy 234 208 217 66 
Solar and other renewables 127 124 125 64 
Electricity generation 127 152 162 57 
aTotal number of responses : 328. 
Both the "conventional wisdom" and minority viewpoints are represented 
among the groups shown in Table A-2. Each has been assigned an abbre-
viation containing three to five alphanumeric characters. For example, the 
IEA (International Energy Agency) provided both a "high demand" and a 
"low demand" scenario. These are denoted, respectively, by IEAHD and 
IEALD 
Only a few of these responses are derived directly from formal models. 
Most are the outcome of judgment and extensive discussions within indi-
vidual organizations. This type of informal process is flexible and has many 
other advantages but makes it difficult to trace the reasons for differences 
between individual projections. We cannot do justice to this issue here but 
hope to make some progress by the time of the next JEW meeting in June 
1985. 
POLL RESULTS-INTERNATIONAL OIL PRICES 
Taking all regions together, there are 61 independent projections 
of the international price of oil for the year 2000. All are reported in 
currency units of constant purchasing power, and as index numbers with 
1980 = 100. Index numbers rather than monetary units are used for both 
oil prices and GNP. This avoids some definitional problems, and increases 
the comparability of the poll responses. 
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0 2010 1980 1990 2000 
YEAR 
Respondent 1990 Respondent 1990 Respondent 2000 Respondent 2000 Respondent 20 I 0 
respb 223 criep 110 stols 240 criep 148 bnl 266 
ipe 173 tea 109 ipe 229 ORIE 147 iemf 243 
trac3 164 smil 105 dnmoe 201 DOE 146 etsld 225 
stols 155 ca l 102 etsld 200 czmoe 146 cerg 215 
obenb 150 assu 102 cecct 199 tea 141 pilot 213 
obena 150 pol as 100 mkr 191 swea 141 fsz 213 
etsld 150 merz 100 nzmoe 188 iiasa 139 DOE 213 
ceoct 141 jaeri 100 ewrsi 182 ift 135 par 200 
iiasa 139 hnpb 100 iemf 181 emcn 135 nzmoe 200 
nzmoe 138 ORIE 99 fsz 181 ieald 132 criep 199 
mkr 134 3rt 99 obenb 175 cal 131 oped 1% 
iemf 134 ieald 98 obena 175 smi l 130 jaeri 175 
esc 134 cec 97 bph 175 merz 130 etshd 175 
atw 134 pilot % bnl 172 assu 122 assu 165 
par 130 res pa 94 doe 168 paec 122 tea 164 
ewrsi 128 eia 94 esc 163 po las 120 smil 150 
wbk 126 ece 92 3rt 161 respi 117 po las 150 
swea 125 cerg 90 par 160 hnpb 110 leob 150 
etshd 125 eni 86 cerg 160 bpi 105 ift 144 
dnmoe 125 ceceu 86 pilot 157 iea83 103 iiasa 139 
gri 125 trac2 85 emch 156 seri 100 paec 122 
stohs 122 cies1 85 wbk 154 o riea 100 hnpb 120 
ift 120 cies 85 smie2 154 ceceu 97 ciesl 68 
bph 120 ieahd 82 smie1 154 ceccp 97 ciesh 50 
fsz 119 DOE 81 gri 153 cec 93 
cecfc 118 leob 80 re spa 153 cede 88 
tracl 116 iee 79 stohs 150 respb 84 
em ch 116 bnl 78 leob 150 ieahd 82 
doe 115 iea83 77 jaeri 150 ciesl 73 
czmoe 115 ceccp 76 etshd 150 ciesh 62 
candd 110 ciesh 75 oped 148 
paec 110 bpi 75 
oped 110 shell 73 
emcn 110 respi 71 
Figure 1. International price of crude oil (1980 = 100). 
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The individual oil-price estimates differ widely-in extreme cases by a 
factor of three. Each estimate is shown as a dot in a frequency distribution 
(Figure 1). With only a few exceptions, the respondents indicated that real 
oil prices will rise from their 1980 level-and at a more rapid rate during 
the 1990s than during the 1980s. Typically, this reflects the view that those 
forces leading to price increases (demands increased by economic growth 
and supplies reduced because of the gradual exhaustion of conventional oil 
and gas resources) will be stronger than those exerting downward pres-
sure on oil prices (conservation responses to the events of the 1970s and the 
introduction of alternative forms of energy supply). The median value of all 
responses is 148 in 2000, equivalent to an average annual price increase of 
2.0 percent from 1980 onward. Clearly this result is incompatible with the 
view that the 1983 oil glut was a "structural" phenomenon, and that low 
prices will persist indefinitely. 
With a little detective work, it is possible to narrow the range of the 
possibilities considered here. For example, one of the lowest responses is 
IEAHD. This represents a "what if?" scenario. The IEA assumes that real 
oil prices will decline between 1980 and 1985, and then will remain stable 
through 2000. Under these circumstances, oil demand is stimulated and 
begins to exceed supplies during the 1990s. This represents an instructive 
thought experiment showing the consequence of "too low" an oil price, but 
it is not a logically consistent scenario. By contrast, consider the same 
organization's low-demand case (IEALD). Through side calculations, it 
can be shown that the IEA's global supply-demand gap would have been 
reduced to zero if the agency had assumed a price level that is close to the 
poll median results. 
Here is a second example of analytic structure determining the poll 
response. Underlying IIASA's 1981 publication Energy in a Finite World 
was a good deal of optimism on the costs and speed of market penetration of 
synthetic fuels. It was believed that tar sands, shale oil or coal-based 
synfuels could expand rapidly in North America, and that their costs would 
be about 40 percent higher (in real terms) than the 1980 price of crude oil. 
This explains why IIASA's initial poll response (the "low" scenario of 1981) 
indicates a 1990 crude-oil price index of 139 (with 1980 = 100) and why the 
index remains at that level through 2010. In effect, synthetic fuels serve as 
an international "backstop" technology in the original study. This leads to 
stable world oil prices-and no increase in the OECD region's net demand 
for oil imports. More recent IIASA calculations (identified as IIA83) have 
arrived at somewhat different conclusions. 
Through the IEW process, we hope to systematize this type of analysis. 
Each participant is urged to provide conjectures as to why stated projec-
tions deviate from the poll medians. Some of the deviation may turn out to 
be errors in reporting or transcription. Others may be connected with 
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definitional differences in regional or product coverage. In other cases, 
there may be explanations that can be related directly to model structure. 
Another round of polls and discussions would help to distinguish the effects 
of assumptions, statistical categories, and analytic features. 
Cynics will be quick to point to other possible explanations for these 
differences. Long-term projections may be heavily influenced by current 
events. For example, there was an oil glut during the 18 months that 
elapsed between the 1981 and 1983 workshops. Between these two polls, 
the median oil-price projection for the year 2000 declined from 175 to 148 
(in real terms, with 1980 = 100). The statistical significance of this result is 
a bit doubtful, because the sample was not identical in both cases. More-
over, one would expect this type of decline if oil prices are following a 
random-walk pattern. Through autocorrelation, projected prices are then 
affected by the current level. Nonetheless, the cynics may be right. Just as 
in macroeconomic forecasting, there is a strong herd instinct that operates 
within the community of energy analysts. In any case, the workshop 
process is bound to lead to healthy introspection-and more attention to 
minority viewpoints. 
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS-OIL AND GAS 
Because oil is a liquid, it can be transported at lower specific costs 
than either natural gas or coal. Until the distant future date when there are 
large-scale movements of methanol and/or hydrogen, it is generally be-
lieved that oil will retain its present position as the principal fuel in 
international trade. Because oil constitutes a "swing'' fuel, small differ-
ences in a region's total energy production or consumption can lead to large 
percentage changes in the quantities of oil imported or exported. 
Measurement problems turn out to be quite serious when we attempt to 
compare oil import and export projections. Within the OECD region, for 
example, there are wide discrepancies between the individual responses 
for the statistical base year of 1980 (Figure 2). These differences account 
for some of the range in import projections in subsequent years. The 
discrepancies in measurement are probably more significant than the 
changes in the median. It would be useful to determine how much of these 
differences can be traced to statistical difficulties in distinguishing between 
crude oil and refined products, and how much is attributable to other 
factors, such as processing losses, stock changes, and bunkers. 
Figure 3 summarizes the workshop's median estimates of interregional 
shipments of oil and gas. (Coal shipments are insignificant at this level of 
regional aggregation. A more detailed geographical breakdown is needed 
in order to analyze coal trade.) The poll provides an automatic global 
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consistency check between independent estimates of interregional trade. 
From the positive and negative entries in Figure 3, we find that the export 
and import totals are in reasonably close balance. Looking at the poll 
responses on a nation-by-nation basis, however, there is evidence that the 
growth in NODC oil imports may be understated. 
2000 
1600 
million tons, 
oil equivalent 
••• 
••• • 
• 
• 1200 
aoo~· 
400 
• •• 
0 ••••••• MEDIAN 
......... -·~  .. 
. .. .. . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•·· 
• 
PROJECTIONS 
oL-~~~~~j_~~~~~--'-~~~~-:-~ 
1980 1990 2000 2010 
YEAR 
Respondent 7980 Respondent 1990 Respondent 2000 Respondent 2010 
sohn 1442 stohs 1395 aohn 1499 opecl 1050 
stols 1360 sohn 1253 oriea 1475 iiasa 842 
stohs 1360 bph 1 790 ieahd 1454 cerg 805 
ope cl 1210 ieahd 1740 stohs 1310 DOE 725 
DOE 1185 gulfb 1725 gulfb 7285 
ipe 1181 res pa 1112 bph 7267 
cerg 1187 wbk 1109 ope cl 1145 
ieald 1180 opecl 1707 ind 1145 
ieahd 1180 eni 7094 wbk 1122 
iea83 1780 stols 1090 iea83 1113 
bpi 1171 iea83 7068 con 7087 
bph 1171 DOE 7025 ipe 1056 
gulfb 1170 cerg 1020 cerg 993 
wbk 1155 ipe 1015 3rt 980 
ind 1155 res pc 1070 DOE 935 
eni 1148 ind 7010 res pa 896 
con 1144 con 995 stols 875 
res pc 1135 ieald 975 ieald 872 
respb 1112 bpi 974 bpi 872 
res pa 1112 3rt 940 ii as a 726 
3rt 1085 iiasa 712 respb 613 
oriea 876 respb 608 
iiasa 797 
Figure 2. OECD oil imports (mtoe). 
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During 1980, the CPE (centrally planned economies) maintained net 
exports of oil to the market economies, but these quantities were quite 
small in relation to OPEC's export volume. According to most of the poll 
participants, there will be a declining trend of net oil exports from the 
CPE, and they might become net importers of oil by the year 2000. Even at 
that point, the CPE will be largely self-sufficient in energy, and will 
substantially increase their gas exports to the OECD. International energy 
markets will continue to be dominated by the oil trade between just 
regions-OPEC and the OECD. 
MTOE 
1500 
-500 
-1000 
-1500 
1980 2000 
GAS 
1980 2000 
Oil 
Figure 3. Exports-imports of oil and gas (mtoe). 
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NODC (non-OPEC developing countries) oil imports will depend upon 
their income growth and their balance-of-payment constraints. There is a 
diversity of opinion on whether these countries will choose to expand their 
domestic oil production, or whether they will shift to less energy-intensive 
lines of development than in the past. Very few of the poll participants 
have projected that the NODC group as a whole will be importing sigrtifi-
cantly more oil in the year 2000 than in 1980. The median indicates a 
decline. In assessing the significance of these results, it would be helpful to 
have more analysis undertaken by the NODCs themselves. Their research 
organizations are underrepresented within the poll. 
ENERGY CONSERVATION, INTERFUEL 
SUBSTITUTION, AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 
Figures 4 and 5 provide a global view of the median poll responses 
for 1980 and 2000 on total primary energy consumption and its breakdown 
into individual fuels. Each pair of bar charts summarizes one region's 
prospects for interfuel substitution and for energy conservation. These 
forces do not operate in an autonomous way. They are a direct consequence 
of the two oil-price shocks of the 1970s-together with the expectation of 
further oil-price increases. 
Except for OPEC, it is projected that total primary energy demands will 
increase less than in proportion to economic growth. Conservation is 
defined here as a residual-the difference between the projected energy 
consumption in 2000 and the demands that would have occurred if the 
energy-GNP ratio had remained constant from 1980 on. Thus, conserva-
tion represents the combined effect of improved technical efficiencies and 
of changes in the economy's product mix. 
The overall reduction in the energy-GNP ratio (expressed in terms of 
primary energy equivalent) is indicated by the conservation component at 
the top of each region's bar for the year 2000. In both centrally planned and 
market economies, conservation represents the largest single source of 
additional energy supplies for 2000. This was once a heresy, but is appar-
ently the prevailing view today. 
Interfuel substitution plays a vital role in explaining why virtually all 
organizations project significant GNP growth, despite little or no increase 
in global oil supplies. Natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy provide the 
principal sources of interfuel substitution, although their relative contri-
butions vary from one respondent to another. A major increase in natural 
gas production is anticipated only within OPEC and the USSR. 
There is general agreement that only a small contribution will be pro-
vided by the renewables: hydroelectric, solar, and biomass. This outcome 
of the poll may be attributed to the inherent limitations of technologies 
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based on dispersed energy sources. It may also be attributed to definitional 
differences, because the 1980 base year responses vary quite erratically 
from one respondent to another. Clearly, it would be worthwhile to 
standardize these definitions and statistics. In any event, the IEW poll 
cannot be expected to resolve the highly charged controversy surrounding 
the renewables and the role that they might play as alternatives to coal and 
nuclear energy. 
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Figure 4. Total primary energy consumption-poll medians-centrally 
planned economies (mtoe). 
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WHY DO ENERGY PROJECTIONS DIFFER? 
The following list offers reasons why energy projections may differ 
from one another. No single factor explains all of the differences. 
Errors in recording and transcribing; 
1980 statistics; 
Date of projection; 
Time horizon of projection; 
Definitional problems; 
Model structure; 
Demand parameters, such as GNP 
gro\Vth, structural changes, regu-
latory approaches to conservation, 
price and income effects, final 
MTOE 
7000 
6000 
5000 
4000 
3000 
2000 
1000 
vs. primary energy demands, and the 
role of electricity; 
Supply parameters, such as conven-
tional resources (geological resource 
base, producibility constraints) and 
unconventional fuels (costs and speed 
of market penetration; 
Philosophical differences, and 
"Stake-Holders": detailed information 
vs. inherent biases. 
CONSERVATION 
(BASED ON REDUCTION 
IN ENERGY-GNP 
RATIO, 1980-2000) 
RENEWABLES 
NUCLEAR 
COAL 
NATURAL GAS 
OTHER FUELS 
(NON-OIL) 
Q I J . · 1 , .. ·--:1 & ::. : I 1.: J I ...... , I ...... :1 
1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 
OECD OPEC NODC 
Figure 5. Total primary energy consumption-poll medians-market econ-
omies (mtoe). 
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First, there can be errors in recording and transcribing the poll entries. 
We have tried to be vigilant about this. Although confident that transcrip-
tion errors are not a significant source of the differences reported here, we 
cannot guarantee to have detected all errors. Iterative polling can be 
helpful in identifying errors, and in reducing the differences between 
base-year (1980) statistical measurements. 
The date of projection is a crucial element in attempting to understand 
why these estimates differ. Recent forecasters are not necessarily wiser 
than earlier ones, but at least they can take advantage of autocorrelation in 
the random-walk pattern that seems characteristic of energy time series. 
The time horizon of the projection may also be a significant element. 
There is some evidence that the longer the time horizon, the lower the 
forecast of the total level of energy demands and the higher are oil prices. 
Definitional problems are a major source of the discrepancies between 
individual projections. It is disturbing to see the wide range of variations in 
base-year (1980) statistics. Some of these variations are attributable to 
differences in the date of projection. 
It is an open issue whether model structure (whether formal or implicit) 
can explain a large part of the variation in poll responses. Our personal 
conjecture is that far less is explained by structure than by differences in 
the numerical assumptions related to supply-and-demand scenarios. Addi-
tional work is needed in order to check this conjecture. 
Uncertainties in GNP growth are frequently cited as a critical element in 
demand forecasting. Over the long term, however, these may be less 
significant than differences in price elasticities of demand, or in the re-
sponse of individual energy consumers to centralized regulations that are 
designed to conserve energy. 
Scenario assumptions may be equally critical on the suwly side of 
international energy markets. Over the next two decades, it is not the 
ultimate resource base, but rather the producibility constraints (e.g., 
leasing and depletion policies) that will determine how rapidly the world's 
nonrenewable resources will be exploited. Moreover, international crises 
and supply disruptions may occur at any moment. These events cannot 
easily be predicted by conventional economic analysis. 
In all of this, perhaps the most elusive factors are philosophical and 
ideological. "Stake-holders" have more detailed information available, but 
have an obvious interest in exaggerating the prospective rate of market 
penetration by their group's specific technology. Similarly, political leaders 
are prone to adopt optimistic targets for their nation's or region's GNP 
growth. Another factor is the personality of the individual forecaster. 
Some have an inclination to focus upon good news, and others prefer to 
predict that doomsday is at hand. (These two attitudes seem to be the 
psychological opposite of the "herd instinct.") 
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In short, there are many imponderable elements that may even uncon-
sciously influence projections. But we also believe the converse to be 
true-that the IEW may exert an influence on these factors. The polling 
process cannot eliminate biases, but can at least contribute to greater 
awareness of their existence. 
On balance, we believe that long-term energy projections are essential 
for both the public and private sectors of the world's economies. Rational 
decisions cannot be based on scenarios that fail the test of logical con-
sistency. Individual projections will continue to differ, but it is worthwhile 
to attempt to understand why. 
POSTSCRIPT ON THE DELPHI TECHNIQUE 
The Delphi technique and the IEW process have elements in 
common, but there are distinct differences. Both entail iterative polling, 
which may lead to "cuing" and to an artificial consensus. And there may be 
unconscious biases in the selection of poll participants. 
There are, however, the following key differences: 
1. The IEW poll does not ask respondents for their personal opinions, 
but rather for their organization's most recent set of published 
projections. Written documents provide a more objective record 
than informal opinions and thereby make a systematic difference in 
the results. 
2. Each respondent is asked to fill in a supplementary questionnaire 
that is designed to elicit' information on the method of projection, 
reasons for differences from poll medians, and critical uncertainties 
in the international energy outlook. Again, this enhances the repro-
ducibility of poll results. 
3. Except for a few cases where anonymity is essential (e.g., as a con-
sequence of US antitrust laws), the individual poll respondents are 
identified. 
4. Face-to-face meetings are an essential part of the IEW process. 
Workshop sessions are more expensive than remote polling, but these 
meetings appear far more effective in identifying the reasons for differ-
ences in projections. On international energy issues, it is just as important 
to understand these differences as to arrive at a logically consistent con-
sensus. And we cannot expect any certainty other than the inevitability of 
surprise. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
A-1. IEW poll form, IIASA, 1983 
A-2. IEW poll respondents 
Other appendix tables, frequency distributions of region-by-region 
energy-GNP ratios, identification of individual countries/regions, indi-
vidual response forms, and frequency distributions ofresponses are avail-
able in the form of a computer printout (approximately 600 pages) and a 
magnetic tape. For further information, please write to Leo Schratten-
holzer at IIASA. Frequency distributions are also available for individual 
countries/regions. 
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Table A-1. International Energy Workshop Poll, llASA, 1983 
Country/Region: 
Organization/project: _________________ _ 
Reference (including date) of most recent report: _______ _ 
Index numbers, constant purchasing power; 
1980 = 100: 
1. International price of crude oil (e.g. 
Arabian Light) 
2. Real GNP (or GDP) 
Primary energy, million tons of oil 
equivalent (mtoe)" 
3. Total consumption 
4. Total production 
5. Oil, consumptionb 
6. Oil, productionb 
7. Oil, exports-importsb 
8. Natural gas, consumption 
9. Natural gas, production 
10. Natural gas, exports-imports 
11. Coal, consumptionc 
12. Coal, productionc 
13. Coal, exports-importsc 
14. Hydroelectric and geothermal 
15. Nuclear energy 
16. Solar and other renewables 
17. Electricity generation (tkWh) 
1980 
100 
100 
•Useful approximations: 1 mtoe/year = 1 ou kilocalories 
1990 
0.65 mtoe/year = 1 million tons coal/year 
50 mtoe/year = 1 million barrels daily 
23 mtoe/year = 1 quad BTU/year 
2000 2010 
bOi l includes natural gas liquids, unconventional oils, and synthetics based on tar sands and 
shale oil. 
ccoal includes solid fuels such as lignite and peat. Includes coal consumed for manufacture of 
synthetic fuels. 
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TableA-2. I EW Poll Respondents 
Last Year Country/Region 
Organization/project Reported Coverage 
ASSU Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 2010 USSR 
June 1983 
ATW Forschungsgesellschaft fur alterna- 1990 Brazil , India, 
tive Technologien und Wirt- Kenya, Malaysia 
schaftsanalysen (ATW), Univer-
sity of Regensburg, October 1982 
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory, 2010 U.S.A. 
1983 (forthcoming) 
BPH, BPL British Petroleum-high- and low- 2000 4-7; OECD Europe 
growth cases, December 1982 
BPPTK Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan 2010 Indonesia 
Teknologi (BPP Teknologi), 
December 1980 
CAL Standard Oil Company of Cali- 2000 4 
fornia, June 1982 
CAN DD CANDIDE Model, Economic Coun- 1990 Canada 
cil of Canada, September 1982 
CECCP, CECEU Commission of the European Com- 2000 Belgium, Denmark, 
CECFC,CEC, munities-Cooperation, Europe, Federal Republic of 
CECCT and Free Competition scenarios, Germany, France, 
and results identical for all 3 seen- Greece, Ireland, 
arios , June 1983; Candidate Tech- Italy, Luxembourg, 
nologies scenario, March 1982 The Netherlands, 
United Kingdom 
CERG Cambridge Energy Research 2010 4-7; U.S.A. and 
Group (UK), R. J. Eden , Canada; Japan , 
Australia and New 
Zealand ; Western 
Europe 
CIES, CIESH, Center for International Energy 2010 8; OECD Europe 
CIESL Studies, Erasmus University-
OECD Europe, high- , and low-
growth estimates, August 1982 
CON Conoco, January 1983 2000 4, 7; U.S.A. 
CPC Chinese Petroleum Corporation , 2000 Taiwan 
February 1982 
CRIEP Central Research Institute of Elec- 2010 Japan 
tric Power Industry, 1982 
CZMOE Czechoslovakian Federal Ministry 2000 Czechoslovakia 
of Fuel and Energy, 1983 
DNMOE Danish Ministry of Energy, 1983 2000 Denmark 
DOE82 U.S . Department of Energy, Office 2000 5,7 
of Policy, Planning, and Analysis , 
and Analysis, July 1982 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy, Office 2010 3, 4, 6; U.S.A. 
of Policy, Planning, and Analysis , 
July 1983 
International Energy Workshop 1983 Poll Responses I 61 
TableA-2. IEW Poll Respondents (Continued) 
Last Year Country/Region 
Organization/project Reported Coverage 
ORIE ORI Europe, March 1983 2000 Western Europe 
ECE U.N. Economic Commission for 1990 USSR; Western 
Europe, General Energy Unit Europe, Eastern 
and Projections and Program- Europe, North 
ming Division, 1982 America, Total of 
ECE Regions 
EEF U.N. Economic Commission for 2000 1; U.S.A 
Europe, General Energy Unit, 
"An Efficient Energy Future," 
March 1983 
EIA U.S. Energy Information Adminis- 1990 4, 5, 7; U.S.A.; 
tration, 1990 Midprice Scenario, Non-U.S.OECD, 
1983 Developing 
Countries 
EMCH ETA-MACRO: China; A.S. Manne, 2000 2 
Stanford University November 
1982 
EMCN ETA-: Canada; J.S. Rogers and 2000 Canada 
T.F. Wilson, University of 
Toronto, May 1983 
ENI Ente Nazionale ldrocarburi (ENI), 1990 4 
1983 
ESC Energy Study Centre, January 2000 The Netherlands 
1983 
ETSHD, ETSLD Energy Technology Systems 2010 Australia, Austria, 
Analysis Project of the Inter- Belgium, Federal 
national Energy Agency-High- Republic of 
and low-demand cases, 1983 Germany, Ireland, 
(forthcoming). Italy, Japan, The 
Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzer-
land, United 
Kingdom, United 
States; Sum of the 
above 14 countries 
EWRSI The East-West Center, Resource 2000 Bangladesh, India, 
Systems Institute, Energy and Pakistan, Papua 
Industrialization Project, 1982 New Guinea, Philip-
pines, Singapore, 
South Korea, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand 
FSZ J.D. Fuller, S.D. Schwartz, and 2010 Canada 
W.T. Ziemba, University of 
British Columbia, Fall 1982 
GRI Gas Research Institute, September 2000 U.S.A. 
1983 
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TableA-2. IEW Poll Respondents (Continued) 
Last Year Country/Region 
Organization/project Reported Coverage 
GULFB, GULFS, Gulf Oil Corporation, Economics 2000 4-7; U.S.A., 
GULFL Division-Baseline, Supply Dis- Canada, Japan ; 
ruption and Low Economic Western Europe, 
Growth scenarios, February 1983 Developing 
Countries 
HNPB Hungarian National Planning 2010 Hungary 
Board-Energy Modeling Group, 
1983 
IAEAH, IAEAL International Atomic Energy 2000 1, 4, 8; OECD North 
Agenc;:y-high- and low-con- America, OECD 
sumption estimates, September Europe, OECD 
1982 Pacific, Asia, Latin 
America, Africa and 
Middle East ; Indus-
trialized Countries; 
Developing 
Countries 
IEA, IEAHD, International Energy Agency- 2000 4-6; USSR 
IEALD Midpoints, high- and low-demand 
scenarios, October 1982 
IEA83 International Energy Agency- 2000 4 
Low-demand scenario, June 1983 
IEE Institute of Energy Economics, 1990 Japan 
Japan, December 1982 
IEMF Israel Energy Modeling Forum, 2010 Israel 
July 1982 
IFT Institute for Future Technology, 2010 Japan 
1982 
I IASA, I IA83 International Institute for Applied 2010 1-4, 7-8; Aggregate 
Systems Analysis, 1981 ; also 1983 of I IASA regions 4 
and 5, llASA region 
6 
IND Standard Oil Company of Indiana, 2000 1-8; Aggregate of 
May1983 Israel , Yugoslavia, 
and South Africa 
INET Institute of Nuclear Energy Tech- 2000 2 
nology, Quinghua University, 
Beijing, December 1981 
IPE IPE Model ; N. Choucri, Massa- 2000 4-7; U .S.A. Japan; 
chusetts Institute ofTechnology, Western Europe 
1982 
JAERI Japan Atomic Energy Research 2010 Japan 
Institute, March 1983 
LEOB J.J. Schmidt, University of Mining 2010 8 
and Metallurgy, Leoben, 1983 
LOVNS A. and H. Lovins, Rocky Mountain 2000 8 
Institute, June 1982 
International Energy Workshop 1983 Poll Responses I 63 
TableA-2. IEW Poll Respondents (Continued) 
Last Year Country/ Region 
Organization/project Reported Coverage 
MERZ N. Merzagora, Economic Analysis 2000 Italy 
Division, ENEA, June 1983 
MKR S.K. Mukherjee and S.H. Rahman, 2000 India 
November 1982 
NGODP International Natural Gas Study, 1990 5; Algeria, Ecuador, 
Harvard University, and the Gabon, Indonesia, 
OPEC Downstream Project, Iran , Iraq, Kuwait , 
East-West Center, B. Mossavar- Libya, Nigeria, 
Rahmani and F. Fesharaki, 1983 Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates, 
Venezuela 
NRMPE Norwegian Royal Ministry of Petro- 1990 Norway 
leum and Energy, 1982 
NZMOE New Zealand Ministry of Energy, 2010 New Zealand 
August 1982 
OBENA, OBENB Observatoire de L'Energie-Scen- 2000 France 
arios A and B, January 1983 
OEWAG Osterreichische Elektrizitatswirt- 2000 Austria 
shafts-AG (Austrian Electric 
Company), 1982 
OLADA, OLADB Organizaci6n Latinoamericana de 2000 Latin America 
Energia (OLADE)-Scenarios A 
and B, 1983 
OPECD, OPECL Org<!nization of Petroleum Export- 2010 4-7 
ing Countries (OPEC)-
Domestic Energy Requirements 
and Long-Term Energy Models, 
1983 (forthcoming) . 
ORIEA Oak Ridge Institute for Energy 2000 1-8 
Analysis, 1982 
PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis- 2010 Pakistan 
sion , December 1982 
PAR J. Parikh, International Institute 2010 India 
for Applied Systems Analysis, 
1982 
PIEEM Potential for Industrial Expansion 2010 8 
Energy Model ; Energy Studies 
Unit , University of Strathclyde, 
Scotland, October 1982 
PILOT PILOT Energy-Economic Model ; 2010 U.S.A. 
P. H . McAllister and J. C. Stone, 
Stanford University, December 
1982 
PO LAS Energy Problems Committee, 2010 Poland 
Polish Academy of Sciences, July 
1982 
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TableA-2. IEW Poll Respondents (Continued) 
Last Year Country/ Region 
Organization/project Reported Coverage 
RESP A Respondent A, January 1983 2000 3-7 
RES PB Respondent B, January 1983 2000 3-7 
RES PC Respondent C, 1982 1990 4-7 
RES PH Respondent H, 1983 2000 Japan 
RESPI Respondent I , 1983 2000 7; U .S.A. Japan; 
Developing Coun-
tries, Western 
Europe 
SERI Solar Energy Research institute- 2000 U.S.A. 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory , 
1981 
SHELL Shell International , London, June 2000 7 
1983 
SMIE1, SMIE2 Spanish Ministry of Industry and 2000 1,2, 8; Japan; 
Energy (MINER)-Scenarios 1 Western Europe, 
and 2, 1983 U.S.A. and Canada, 
Latin America, 
Africa, Middle East, 
Aggregate of South 
Asia, Southeast 
Asia, and Austral-
asia 
SMIL V. Smil , University of Manitoba, 2010 2,8 
1983 
SOHN I. Sohn , New York University, 2000 1-8 
December 1982 
STOHS, STOLS R. Stobaugh-high- and low- 2000 4-6 
energy supply cases, May 1982 
SWEA Swedish Energy Agency, June 1983 2000 4 
TEA J. Brady, National Board for 2010 Ireland 
Science and Technology, Ireland, 
April/May 1983 
TRAC1 , TRAC2, Tractionel-Scenarios 1, 2, and 3, 1995 Belgium 
TRAC3 July 1982 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Develop- 1990 2; Japan; North 
ment Organization (UNIDO), America, Western 
February 1983 Europe, Eastern 
Europe, Latin 
America 
WBK World Bank, July 1982 2000 1-8 
WECHG , WECLG World Energy Conference (WEC) 2000 3, 7, 8; Developing 
-Preliminary projections, 1983 Countries (5 + 6) 
(forthcoming) 
3RT 3RT Model ; A.S. Manne and P.V. 2000 4-7 
Preckel, Stanford University, 
March 1983 
